Violent internal conflicts in the decade after the dissolution of Yugoslavia have led Bosnia and
Macedonia, arguably the two most complex and contested multi-ethnic regions in the Balkans,
to adopt inter-ethnic peace settlements as the basis for their internal stability and constitutional
order. Despite the proximate times of their enactment, the settlements represent two opposing
views on inter-ethnic peace-building: Bosnia’s Dayton Agreement is based on a territorial
separation of ethnic groups into federal entities, while Macedonia’s Ohrid Agreement relies on
institutional inter-ethnic integration and accommodation in a unitary state.
The performance of the two models in the past proved decidedly advantageous for Macedonia; the
lack of a cumbersome federal structure allowed Macedonia to swiftly conclude the stabilization
phase and make important strides towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Shifting political constellations
in Macedonia after the 2006 elections, however, have gradually undermined the consensus
necessary to maintain the loose and flexible structure of the Ohrid Agreement operational.
The article makes a comparative analysis of the advantages of the Ohrid Agreement model, and
examines if the current political dynamics will allow Macedonia’s inter-ethnic peace to maintain
its present shape or will necessitate an evolution into a more rigid, quasi-federal model.