EU candidate countries must prove their respect for democracy and the rule of law to be eligible for EU
membership. The Commission administers their accession processes following the principle of conditionality.
This paper examines how domestic conditions and different aspects of the conditionality principle affect policy
outcomes. It reviews the arguments made in the literature on EU conditionality and applies them to the policy
areas of minority rights and the fight against corruption in Croatia and Macedonia. Both countries have been
subjected to the Commission’s conditionality while their democratic achievements differ substantially. Thereby,
the two countries offer a fruitful ground to evaluate the lessons drawn from the 2004-07 enlargement. While
previous studies have remained quite unclear about the relative importance of domestic and EU-related
determinants of effective conditionality, I argue that domestic influences vary strongly across the researched
policy areas. In comparison, the political-legal instruments of the Commission show clear impacts on policies in
candidate countries. Material incentives offered by the EU are only effective within the early phases of the
accession process.