The overarching topic of this volume is the exercise of political power in
Vietnam. Various chapters illuminate the Communist Party of Vietnam’s
(CPV) staying power (Vu), dissent and its repression (Kerkvliet, Thayer),
selection methods in an authoritarian assembly (Malesky), and civil society
(Wells-Dang) and accountability (Vasavakul). All these chapters focus on
the CPV’s relationship with the rest of society. This chapter adds a different
approach by analyzing relationships within the CPV – between central
and provincial Party elites. This principal-agent problem emerged after the
1986 doi moi market reforms, which gave provincial leaders more influence
in Ha Noi, as provincial revenue increasingly paid the bills of the central
treasury. Moreover, international economic integration altered dependencies
within the state. The economic performance of localities began to
depend less on domestic factors than on foreign direct investment (FDI)
and international trade; thus local cadres may look to foreign investors and
markets as they seek rents from political office. Such a constellation poses
a challenge to central authorities, because local leaders can engage in fence
breaking – a process of pushing the legal envelope as far as possible, and
on occasion intentionally overstepping provincial legal authority during
interprovincial competition for foreign investors. Contestation within the
CPV at different levels of the Party apparatus is likely to impact forms of
dissent and coercion, the development of civil society, and of course the
(s)election processes of Party leaders. The findings of this chapter thus
complement other research presented in this volume.