When deciding who should receive welfare benefits with
the aim to increase household well-being, it is necessary
to understand the effects of the distribution of power
within the households at which the aid is directed. Two
primary household models have been used to study intrahousehold
bargaining and decision making: the unitary
model and the collective model. The unitary model seems
to fit Pakistan’s context because the prevailing traditional
culture positions the male head as the household
decision maker. However, using a set of direct measures of decision-making power from the Pakistan Social and
Living Standard Measurement Survey, this study finds
that even in a country where men seem to have more
power than women, the collective household bargaining
model applies. This study also finds that, in Pakistan,
when women have more decision-making power at home,
households tend to spend more on women’s preferred
goods (such as clothing and education), family members
eat more non-grain food items, and children, particularly
girls, are more likely to be enrolled in school.