This study uses variation in natural resource rents and mineral production among Peruvian municipalities to analyze the impact of resource booms on local politicians’ behavior and citizens’ well-being. Although this topic has recently attracted the attention of scholars, the existing empirical evidence remains inconclusive regarding whether resource booms are beneficial or detrimental to citizens via their effects on public good provision and living standards. I argue that, despite the fact that many of the existing theoretical models allow for the possibility of non-monotonic responses, the empirical literature has mostly approached this phenomena using linear models, failing to understand the complex nature of resource booms. Exploiting the recent extraordinary increase in mineral prices along with a set of rules for the distribution of natural resource rents in Peru, I show that the effects of resource booms in reelection outcomes, political competition, public goods provision, clientelism and well-being are conditional to the size of the rents in a non-monotonic fashion. These results are robust to endogenous production responses and are consistent with a simple model of electoral competition in a resource rich economy.