Type | Working Paper - CCER, Beijing University |
Title | The Problem of Taxing Peasants in China |
Author(s) | |
Publication (Day/Month/Year) | 2002 |
URL | http://137.189.161.113/PaperCollection/webmanager/wkfiles/1721_1_paper.pdf |
Abstract | By using a panel data set covering 10 provinces in China from 1986 to 1999, we present the stylized facts of rural taxation in China. We find that the rural taxation rates did not increase as fast as many people conceived. The main reason that rural taxation became an acute problem in 1990s is in large part due to the increase of rural income disparity after 1990s and the uneven tax and fee distribution among different income groups. The low-income peasants pay much higher shares of taxes and fees as percentages of their incomes, which was mainly due to the fact that the poor people are usually the group of people with lowest proportion of income from non-agricultural sources, thus they are more vulnerable to rural taxation. We also find that government regulation is an important factor to explain rural taxation burdens. The reason is that the regulation entails a lot of costs not only in policy implementation and administration, but also in corruption, since local officials can impose extra charges on peasants in the name of implementing the central government regulations, given that the local enforcement cost of regulation is unobservable to central government. Most importantly, with a general theoretical framework, we further analyze the relationships between government regulation and rural taxation, rural factor mobility, and also rural income growth and disparity. We hypothesize that with differentiating regulation such as grain procurement across regions (and also across households), regions (and households) that are more heavily regulated tend to have heavier rural taxation, more vulnerable to local bureaucracy expansion and serious corruption, lower labor and land mobility, and thus, will result in lower income growth. Preliminary empirical studies strongly support our hypothesis. Moreover, the more heavily regulated regions (and households) will be more locked in agricultural production, which will further result in heavier rural taxation and even lower income growth. This constitutes a vicious cycle for the more heavily regulated regions (and households), while the opposite happens to the less regulated regions (and households). In conclusion, our general framework can help us to understand the increasing income disparity, the highly regressive nature of rural taxation and their relationships with government regulation simultaneously. Policy implications are also drawn in rearranging inter-governmental relationships, removing or relaxing of government regulations, and more generally, establishing a more reasonable rural public finance system. |