Asymmetric allocation of men and women across occupations had been widely considered as a main factor that could explain gender wage differentials, especially at the top of the distribution of wages. Whether this difference in the occupation structure between the two sexes is essentially due to differences in productive characteristics, to self-selection or to employer’s discrimination is still an unaccomplished debate. We propose in this paper a dynamic model of statistical discrimination in job assignment and promotion which takes into account both the endogeneity of investment in human capital and fertility decision, and where employer’s prior belief are self- fulfilling in equilibrium. Building on Lazear and Rosen’s (1990) model we show how, under certain conditions, discrimination/self-selection at the hiring stage may change equilibrium’s results by altering employer’s believes about expected quit rates and ability of workers. We test the hypotheses of our model using a multivariate simulated maximum likelihood. The inequality
in job promotion is analyzed by applying a generalized residuals approach. Our Main results seem to confirm the model’s assumption. That is, when adversity against women is significant during the hiring process, the group who overcome this initial discrimination becomes as likely as promoted as their male colleagues