Many countries make special institutional arrangements to guarantee the political representation of minorities. This is usually justified as a way of reducing ethnic tensions and improving the quality of democratic representation. In addition, it is often assumed that minority representatives will act in the interest of their group. India has had reserved seats for the Scheduled Castes (SCs, the former ‘untouchables’) in their state assemblies since independence. Reserved constituencies are single member districts where only SCs can run for election, while the whole population votes for them irrespective of their caste group. In this dissertation I explore the effects of these quotas between 1974 and 2007. I am able to control for the selection bias inherent in quotas being non-randomly assigned in the 1970s by matching more than 3,000 constituencies on pre-treatment variables from 1971. Using unique new data at the constituency-level for 15 Indian states, I show that the quotas have been effective at guaranteeing the political presence of SCs and integrating them into main-stream politics. Contrary to the bias often reported against SC politicians, they are not much different from other politicians: they represent similar parties, have similar rerunning patterns, and hold many cabinet positions. In fact, rather than being spokespersons of the SC community, SC politicians seem to be agents of their parties rather than agents of their group. The presence of SC politicians seems to have had positive effects on caste bias in society at large, though, with voters in reserved areas reporting less caste discrimination than voters in non-reserved areas. Considering how strong the social boundary of untouchability used to be in Indian society, this can be seen as a huge achievement in itself. But the integration of SC politicians, and the fact that they are answerable to mostly non-SC voters, also means that their presence has not done much to improve the substantive representation of SC interests. This can therefore serve as a reminder that there are clear trade-offs in institutional design and that an electoral system might work well to reduce social bias and prevent conflict without improving the substantive representation of minority groups.