rominent theories of insurgency emphasize that areas with low levels of economic development are conducive to insurgent resource mobilization. Still, it is unclear which development-related conditions are important and how these conditions are linked to mechanisms explaining local populations‘ contributions to insurgency. To build theory on these questions, I analyze how local poverty, state capacity and accessibility affected insurgent resource mobilization in Nepal. This is done by comparing processes of insurgent mobilization in four districts that differ in terms of development-related factors, drawing on 80 qualitative interviews with villagers and political elites. I find that the mechanisms of insurgent contributions depended on the type of resource. Most people contributed food, money, information, and part-time labor mainly out of rational security considerations. State weakness strongly facilitated insurgent mobilization of these resources by allowing the insurgents to carve out control which they used to shape security incentive structures. Rebel recruitment was more complicated, since Maoist control did not make full-time participation the safest choice for most people. Low state capacity mainly facilitated rebel recruitment through a flawed counterinsurgency campaign that targeted non-combatant Maoist supporters, giving them both an emotional impetus and lower security cost of rebelling. I did not find evidence that poverty was equally important for any type of resource mobilization.